BUILDING THE ULTIMATE DAM

From CHAPTER SIX (pp. 109-134):

The most important of the Eastern engineers [to become involved in planning for the Great Western Power Company's along the Feather River in northern California] was John R. Freeman, a prominent consultant from Providence, Rhode Island, who had graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1876.


First employed by the Essex Company, the owner of water power rights in the industrial city of Lawrence, Massachusetts,... in the 1890s Freeman became president of the Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, a position he held for the rest of his life and in which he served (and cultivated) America's manufacturing elite.


By the turn of the century, Freeman also had established a practice as a consulting engineer specializing in water power and municipal water supply. In the latter capacity he provided guidance regarding Boston's expanding water supply system (which included the masonry gravity Wachusett Dam); and by the turn of the century, he was also serving as a key adviser for New York City's proposed Catskill Aqueduct. Freeman further solidified his national reputation by securing both the presidency of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the vice presidency of the American Society of Civil Engineers before turning 50 years old.


* * * * * * * * * * *
When [Great Western Power Company president Edwin] Hawley became sick in the fall of 1911 and changes in GWPC management began to look more probable, Freeman expressed displeasure with Eastwood's Big Meadows Dam design and advised board member Guy Earl that he "was sorry also not to have a chance to talk a little with Mr. Fleishacker [the GWPC president-in-waiting] about his proposed dam at the outlet of Big Meadows. As a stockholder I am interested and have many doubts about the best type having been selected. It does not pay to carry economy to excess in dam building and there is nothing quite so satisfying as a big solid mass of concrete."


A few months later, Freeman elaborated on these comments and offered assistance to the GWPC because of his"former association" with and "large financial interest" in the firm's business. Specifically, he made sure company officers realized that "in addition to my bonds, I have tucked away in my tin box about 600 shares each of the [company's] common and preferred stocks."


By late September [1912], Freeman was back in New England preparing a formal statement relating to his visit to [the construction site of Eastwood's] Big Meadows Dam. But before sending this report to the GWPC, he confided to A.P. Davis--in a "personal and confidential" letter--his concern about Eastwood's design.


Freeman told Davis that he had "repeatedly informally urged" the company "to build a big massive lump of a dam... but offered little scientific or tecnhical objection to multiple arch dams; instead he dwelt on nonengineering aspects of Eastwood's designs. Claiming that "the psychology of these airy arches and the lace curtain effect of [Eastwood's] stiffening props is not well suited to inspire public confidence," Freeman confided to Davis that the GWPC would soon have troubles with "popular apprehensions and misapprehensions."


Freeman's emotional approach... deftly catered to the technological naivete and fears of businessmen who felt ill-equipped to challenge the professional opinion of a highly respected engineer. In subsequent arguments, Freeman continued to castigate the dam's "thin" appearance and "psychological" attributes--ostensibly on behalf of the public--and the tactic soon became central to his strategy to force abandonment of Eastwood's structure.


* * * * * * * * * * *
A review of the events surrounding the Big Meadows Dam controversy verifies that non-technical, "psychological" issues played a crucial role in the GWPC's decision-making process. Aside from making general comments about "thin clay seams" or subsurface water flow, no one ever enunciated a quantifiable, technical argument to suggest that the multiple arch dam was unsafe or inappropriate for the site.


At most, structural criticisms called into question the longterm stability of reinforced concrete or the multiple arch dam's ability to resist seismic shocks. In lieu of offering viable appearance; the nontechnical public was assumed incapable of appreciating theoretical vindications of the design.


* * * * * * * * * * *
Following his dismissal from the GWPC, Eastwood became almost completely separated from the world of large-scale hydroelectric power systems. In later life, he undertook some additional design work in the field, but never again did he occupy a position as prominent as the ones he had held at Big Creek and Big Meadows. And although he originally accepted the Hume Lake and Big Bear Valley commissions as steping-stones to future work in hydroelectic power development, they soon served as vital precedents for the business he pursued during the final years of his life.

Return to the Excerpts & Sources Main Page.

Return to the Building the Ultimate Dam Main Page.